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Abstract 
Increasing evidence from several domains of research indicates that similar neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlie both the ability to remember the past and the ability to imagine novel 
future events.  An emerging hypothesis accounting for these similarities suggests that the 
contents of episodic memory are retrieved and then recombined to provide the source 
material when mentally simulating future events.  Accordingly, executive processes may play 
a key role in the strategic retrieval and binding of past episodes into a unitary future event 
representation.  In the current study, I investigated the extent to which individual differences 
in working memory capacity contributed to the ability to imagine future autobiographical 
events.  College students completed measures of working and short-term memory and were 
cued to recall autobiographical memories and imagine future autobiographical events 
consisting of varying levels of specificity (i.e., ranging from generic to increasingly specific 
and detailed events).  The results indicated that future thought was related to performance on 
measures of autobiographical memory, which likely reflects similar retrieval demands 
associated with both past and future oriented autobiographical tasks.  In addition, after 
controlling for autobiographical memory, residual working memory variance only 
independently predicted future specificity.  I suggest that working memory provides the 
attentional and inhibitory resources necessary in order to imagine specific future episodic 
events. 
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Episodic Future Thought:  Contributions from Working Memory 
The ability to disengage from the present environment and shift one’s perspective 
across space and time is thought to be a uniquely human characteristic (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007).  The concept of mental time travel, in which we can mentally project 
ourselves both backward into the past and forward into the future, may provide an adaptive 
advantage aiding in flexible problem solving and decision making by allowing one to use the 
lessons learned in the past in approaching present and future situations (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).  Likewise, memories of past events and 
foresight into the future become fundamental in creating the phenomenological 
representation of a self-concept that is consistent across space and time, conceptually referred 
to as autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1985).  A growing body of research is therefore 
beginning to approach episodic memory as not only a cognitive mechanism for recalling past 
events but as a broader vehicle allowing for the projection of oneself into both the 
experienced past and imagined future (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Busby & 
Suddendorf, 2005; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Okuda et al., 2003; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007).  Conceptualizing episodic memory in this broader context suggests similar 
or shared neurocognitive mechanisms underlying both episodic memory and the ability to 
imagine events in the future, alternatively referred to as episodic future thought (Atance & 
O’Neill, 2001).   
The adaptive advantage of using past experiences to aid future oriented behavior 
suggests that executive processes may be used to access lessons learned in the past in order to 
shape present and future behavior.  Generative models of autobiographical memory propose 
that semantic autobiographical information (including goals and life events) is used to guide 
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strategic access to contents stored within long-term memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000).  Research has suggested similar generative processes at work when imagining future 
events (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011).  The strategic retrieval mechanisms supporting both 
past and future mental time travel may therefore be mediated by similar executive processes 
(D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 2010). 
Though autobiographical memory and future thought are believed to share underlying 
mechanisms, additional executive resources may be necessary to support the increased 
demands of constructing a novel future event (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; D’Argembeau 
et al., 2010).  Expanding on this idea, in the current study I took an individual differences 
approach to examine the relationship between episodic future thought and working memory 
(WM), a widely studied measure of executive attention that has been implicated in a number 
of higher order cognitive processes (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane et 
al., 2004).  Though WM has previously been suggested to contribute to the ability to imagine 
the future (Schacter & Addis, 2007a; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), and evidence has 
indicated a potential functional relationship between WM and measures of future directed 
behavior (Bickel, Yi, Landes, Hill, & Baxter, 2011), the direct contributions of WM capacity 
on future thought have not been systematically investigated.  In the following sections, I will 
first review evidence which indicates overlapping mechanisms underlying episodic memory 
and future thought.  I will then discuss models of WM accounting for a functional 
relationship with long-term memory, while framing the potential role of WM capacity in 
contributing to episodic future thought.  
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Evidence for Shared Mechanisms Supporting Past and Future Autobiographical Events 
Evidence from several domains of research support the idea of similar neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying both episodic memory and future thought.  Case studies of amnesiac 
patients indicate that the loss of episodic memory corresponds with similar deficits in the 
ability to imagine the future (Klein, Loftus, & Kihsltrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985).  For 
example, Tulving (1985) reported on patient N. N. who suffered from severe amnesia for 
personal events occurring both before and after the onset of his condition.  When asked to 
imagine events in the future, N. N. was unable to do so; it was only after further probing that 
the patient described his attempts at imaging the future as consisting of blankness, similar to 
that of being asleep.  Klein and colleagues (2002) reported similar observations of patient D. 
B. whose severe amnesia corresponded to a related inability to imagine himself in the future.  
However, D. B.’s deficits were noted to be restricted to personally relevant events.  In 
contrast, his ability to recall semantic events from the past and to contemplate future events 
occurring within the public domain remained relatively intact, indicating a dissociation 
between autobiographical and semantic mental time travel. 
 Similar to those suffering from amnesia, research has identified additional patient 
populations displaying similar patterns of memory deficits extending into the ability to 
contemplate the future.  For example, Williams and colleagues (1996) reported that suicidally 
depressed individuals displayed reduced specificity when recalling past events – that is, they 
tended to recall generic or categorical events rather than events corresponding to a particular 
episode – and this correlated with their reduced specificity when imagining future events. 
Likewise, Lind and Bowler (2010) reported that, relative to comparison populations, autistic 
adults had trouble generating specific past and future events, indicating marked impairments 
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in both episodic memory and future thinking.  Schizophrenic patients were found to show 
similar patterns, reporting significantly fewer specific past and future events compared to 
controls, with the future condition exhibiting more pronounced group disparity 
(D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008).  Interestingly, the deficits in generating 
specific past and future events exhibited by autistic and schizophrenic patients were unrelated 
to performance on measures of general fluency in both populations, indicating that the 
impairments observed in episodic memory and future thought cannot be solely accounted for 
by retrieval difficulties (D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2010). 
 Developmental research provides further evidence for overlap between recalling the 
past and imagining the future.  Although children may begin to successfully recall previously 
experienced events at a younger age, it is generally believed that it is not until the age of 
about four that children begin to generate contextually rich and personally significant 
episodic memories (Levine, 2004; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997).  It is 
also around this age that children begin to demonstrate more sophisticated planning and 
anticipatory behaviors related to the future (Atance & O’Neill, 2001).  In a study in which 
young children were asked to report an event from yesterday and an event to take place 
tomorrow, Busby and Suddendorf (2005) found that episodic memory and future thought 
emerged in tandem in 3-5 year olds.   
 On the other end of the developmental spectrum, age related declines in episodic 
memory have been observed to correspond with similar impairments in future oriented 
thought (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008).  Though semantic knowledge shows little change 
and is perhaps facilitated across the lifespan, aging is accompanied by reduced production of 
contextual and temporally specific autobiographical details (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, 
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& Moscovich, 2002).  Addis et al. (2008) extended these findings to reveal that age related 
impairments in recalling past autobiographical events correspond to similar specificity 
deficits when attempting to imagine future events.  
In addition to the extensive evidence of parallel deficits observed in a variety of 
populations, similarities in the phenomenological characteristics of recalling the past and 
imagining the future lend further support for a shared mechanism underlying both episodic 
memory and future thought.  Specifically, many of the subjective aspects of recalling the past 
and imagining the future appear to be bound by similar constraints.  The valence and 
temporal distance of both past and future events similarly affects the subjective aspects of our 
mental representations of those events, with positive and temporally close events being more 
richly remembered or imagined (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).  A bias to maintain 
a positive self-concept, driven by personal goals and motives, may explain the impact of 
positive valence on the contextual details of past and future simulations (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2008).  Autobiographical memory has 
often been shown to exhibit a strong positivity bias, whereby positive events are more richly 
recollected than negative events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008).  Likewise, 
simulations of future events typically involve more positive and idyllic representations 
(Bernsten & Jacobsen, 2008), likely indicating similar self-enhancement strategies.   
Brain imaging studies have also indicated a core neural network underlying episodic 
memory  and future thought, including areas of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), medial 
temporal lobes (MTL), and extending posteriorly into the parietal and occipital lobes (Addis, 
Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Addis et al., 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; 
Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007).  These regions are widely 
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regarded as comprising the autobiographical memory network (Svoboda, McKinnon, & 
Levine, 2006), and their engagement during both past and future oriented tasks has been 
hypothesized to reflect the shared contributions of self-referential, retrieval, and contextual 
binding processes inherent in both recalling an autobiographical past and imagining a 
personally relevant future (Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008). 
Activation of posterior neural regions, including bilateral parahippocampal, 
retrosplenial, and posterior cingulate cortices, extending into the precuneus and occipital 
areas has also been reported during both past and future episodic thinking (Addis et al., 2007; 
Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007).  These regions likely support 
the integration of contextual and visuo-spatial information into a coherent episodic 
representation (Botzung et al., 2008; Szpunar et al., 2007).  Furthermore, preferential 
engagement of parahippocampal and posterior cingulate cortices and superior occipital 
regions has been observed during tasks which involve thinking about an event in a familiar 
versus unfamiliar context, suggesting a tendency to place ourselves within familiar contexts 
when imagining future events (Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009).  
Addis et al. (2007) incorporated an event-related functional magnetic resonance 
imaging design to investigate the neural substrates of episodic memory and future thought.  
This method allowed the authors to distinguish between the initial construction and 
subsequent elaboration phases of past and future thought.  As expected, their results indicated 
extensive neural overlap during the elaboration phase of both episodic memory and future 
thought, which they attributed to similar demands placed on autobiographical retrieval 
mechanisms related to self-referential, contextual, and episodic imagery processes.  The 
construction phase, however, was marked by considerable neural differentiation between the 
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two temporal directions.  Of particular note during this phase was the lateralized 
hippocampal function corresponding with past and future event construction.  Though the left 
hippocampal activity was observed during both past and future events, the right hippocampus 
was found to be preferentially engaged during the future oriented tasks, a surprising finding 
given this structure’s widely regarded role in memory retrieval (Svoboda et al., 2006).  The 
authors noted that, whereas recalling a past event involves the reintegration of previously 
bound information into a coherent mental event simulation, imagining a future event involves 
the novel integration of information.  This fundamental difference between past and future 
event construction may account for the differential hippocampal involvement.  Specifically, 
Addis and colleagues (2007) suggested that left hippocampal activity observed early during 
the construction phase likely reflects the interaction between event cues and stored memory 
traces, which would be necessary for both past and future event construction.  Further 
activation of the right hippocampus during future oriented tasks likely supports the novel 
integration of distinct component episodes into a coherent future event.  Investigations of 
amnesiac patients with hippocampal damage have similarly implicated this regions role 
supporting the novel integration of disparate details into a unified event (Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann, & Maguire, 2007).  Specifically, when asked to imagine novel events, Hassabis and 
colleagues found that, relative to control subjects, responses made by the amnesiac patients 
were fragmented and lacking in spatial coherence, leading to an overall lack of a unified 
episodic representation. 
Okuda and colleagues (2003) were among the first to observe overlapping patterns of 
regional cerebral blood flow as subjects recalled events from their past and imagined events 
in their future.  Notably, the authors reported less bilateral deactivation in anterior portions of 
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the mPFC during past and future autobiographical tasks relative to a semantic control task.  
Szpunar et al. (2007) reported similar patterns of attenuated mPFC deactivation during tasks 
requiring participants to elaborate on past and future autobiographical events, relative to a 
control task in which a semantically known 3rd person was imagined (Bill Clinton).  These 
patterns of mPFC deactivation in response to autobiographical demands are consistent with 
this region’s hypothesized role in supporting self-referential mental activity (D’Argembeau et 
al., 2007; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Wicker, Ruby, 
Royet, & Fonlupt, 2003).  The mPFC has also been hypothesized to underlie the ability to 
dissociate from the present experience and direct our attention to a temporally distinct event, 
thus allowing us to mentally travel through time (Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003), 
an idea supported by regional overlap with Theory of Mind tasks, which similarly require 
shifting focus away from the immediate environment (Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Mar, 
& Kim, 2009).  The mPFC has thus been suggested to serve as the neural seat of autonoetic 
consciousness (Wheeler et al., 1997).  
In addition to the mPFC, episodic past and future tasks have also been observed to 
engage left ventrolateral (Addis et al., 2007) and left dorsolateral (Botzung et al., 2008) 
prefrontal cortex, which may reflect executive retrieval operations.  Specifically, 
ventrolateral and dorsolateral frontal areas may correspond to the cueing and monitoring of 
memory search, respectively, with anterior areas playing more of an executive role in 
switching between these processes (Fletcher & Henson, 2001). 
Overlapping activation patterns observed between both episodic past and future 
oriented thought could indicate that our memories of past events are similarly recruited both 
when recalling the past and imagining novel future episodes.  According to the constructive 
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episodic simulation hypothesis proposed by Schacter and Addis (2007b), the contents of our 
episodic memories are recruited as source material and flexibly recombined in order to 
produce novel mental representations of future events.  The notion that our episodic 
memories are utilized in generating representations of a novel event is supported by 
neuroimaging research indicating that, within the core neural network underlying both past 
and future episodic thought, future oriented thought tends to elicit increased neural activity 
relative to recalling the past, potentially indicating the increased cognitive demands of 
flexibly recombining multiple past episodes in generating a novel simulation of a future 
event (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007).   
Proposed Role of WM in Constructing Novel Future Events 
Though extensive attention has been focused on the neural correlates of episodic past 
and future directed thought, the cognitive components that support the construction of 
episodic mental representations remain less clear.  One aspect of mental time travel that 
remains to be thoroughly explored is the role of WM in integrating elements from our 
experienced past to form novel mental representations of future events.  WM capacity is a 
widely used measure of controlled attention, which serves to hold important information in a 
readily accessible state which is subsequently capable of being processed and manipulated in 
support of various cognitive demands (Miyake & Shah, 1999).  Accordingly, WM capacity 
has been linked to a range of higher order cognitive abilities, such as general fluid 
intelligence, reading and language comprehension, among others (Engle et al., 1999).  With 
respect to episodic future thought, WM may play a role in the strategic retrieval and active 
maintenance of relevant episodic memories, providing the cognitive structure on which these 
episodes may be flexibly recombined to create a coherent, novel simulation of a future event. 
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If WM does indeed play a role in flexibly recombining contents from our episodic 
memories to construct novel representations, the cognitive mechanisms and neural substrates 
underlying WM would need to exhibit at least partial overlap with long-term memory 
(LTM).  Indeed, investigations of amnesiac patients (Baddeley & Wilson, 2002), as well as 
examinations into the constructive validity of WM and LTM tasks (Unsworth, 2010), does 
seem to indicate cognitive overlap.  Evidence from behavioral research also supports the 
interaction between WM and LTM processes.  For example, the typical span for the recall of 
a sequence of unrelated words is about five; however, when recalling a meaningful sentence, 
this span increases to roughly 16 words (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley & Wilson, 2002).  This 
increased span likely indicates a process known as chunking, in which semantic associations 
between words, made possible by the retrieval of semantic knowledge stored within LTM, 
results in the partitioning of conceptual units within a sentence into a more manageable 
number of component ideas, which are then more easily recalled (Baddeley, 2000).   
Neuroimaging investigations of WM indicate neural activity in brain regions 
corresponding to those that contribute to the core network underlying episodic past and 
future thinking, notably prefrontal and medial temporal cortices, further suggesting a 
relationship between WM and LTM. (Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Cabeza, 
Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Chein, Moore, & Conway, 2011).  Such neural overlap is 
particularly evident with respect to WM tasks that require the reconstruction of displaced 
memories rather than simple short-term storage and retrieval processes (Chein et al., 2011).  
For example, WM and episodic retrieval tasks have both been shown to produce overlapping 
activation in left dorsolateral prefrontal and MTL regions (Cabeza et al., 2002).  Left 
lateralized activation of dorsolateral PFC regions has been suggested to play a role in 
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monitoring information within the focus of attention, whether the information is being 
transiently stored for WM tasks or the subject of episodic retrieval from LTM (Cabeza et al., 
2002; Faraco et al., 2011).  Overlapping MTL activations, including bilateral hippocampal 
and parahippocampal areas, may indicate this region’s role in mediating indexing operations 
for the retrieval of task relevant information.  Preferential engagement of dorsolateral PFC 
(Addis et al., 2007) and MTL (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003) regions during the 
construction of future episodic events, relative to past events, may suggest the increased 
demands of maintaining multiple episodes retrieved from LTM in order to mentally simulate 
a detailed future event (Addis et al., 2007). 
Numerous theoretical frameworks have been proposed attempting to account for the 
relationship between WM and LTM.  These theories often take different approaches in 
explaining how contents stored in LTM are retrieved and subsequently monitored in order to 
provide the information maintained in WM.  Structural approaches tend to focus on 
describing the executive and storage components underlying WM, and how they interact in 
order to encode, retrieve, and maintain information (e.g., Baddeley, 2000; Logie, 2003).  
Functional approaches tend to focus on the underlying purpose of the WM system, typically 
viewing WM capacity as the ability to direct controlled attention to task relevant resources in 
order to complete complex cognitive tasks (e.g., Engle et al., 1999).    
Structural approaches to the WM-LTM relationship.  Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
proposed a three component, limited capacity model of WM in order to conceptualize the 
role of the temporary storage of multimodal information in cognitive performance.  This 
model consists of two domain specific subsidiary storage systems, the phonological loop and 
the visuo-spatial sketchpad, which are capable of storing verbal and visual information, 
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respectively, and the domain general central executive, which controls the selective access 
and manipulation of information stored within the temporary subsidiary systems.  This 
original model has since been modified in an attempt to better account for the WM-LTM 
relationship.  Baddeley (2000) introduced the concept of the episodic buffer to provide 
limited capacity storage of multimodal information, which is capable of binding information 
retrieved from the subsidiary short term storage systems and LTM into a coherent episodic 
representation (Baddeley, 2000).  The episodic buffer is assumed to provide a modeling 
space for producing novel scenarios that can guide future action (Baddeley & Wilson, 2002).  
Investigating the ability of amnesiac patients to recall the basic gist of a prose passage 
consisting of about 15-20 idea units, Baddeley and Wilson (2002) observed that patients who 
were uniformly bad at recalling a passage after a delay often were within the normative range 
when recalling the passage immediately after the initial presentation.  These results were 
interpreted as being consistent with the functional role of the episodic buffer.  Specifically, 
the authors suggested that the preservation of immediate prose recall involves the temporary 
activation of representations held in LTM, ranging from individual words and phrases to 
more general conceptual schemas.  This activated information is then held in temporary 
storage via the episodic buffer.    
Logie (2003) proposed a model of WM as a mental workspace, in which a semantic 
knowledge base held in LTM is activated in response to perceptual stimuli.  For example, 
when viewing an object such as a stapler, the perceived visual elements of the stapler (lines, 
edges, color, etc.) activate associated meanings based on our previous experiences with 
staplers.  When viewing a stapler, one can imagine what it would feel like to hold it, or what 
would happen if it was thrown at someone.  It is possible to imagine these particular details 
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despite the fact that they are not a part of the immediate visual perception of the stapler.  It is 
these activated representations that are then held in temporary storage and are capable of 
manipulation, which ultimately allows for mental discovery and the generation of new 
knowledge (Logie, 2003).   
Cowan (1995, 1999) takes a similar approach in functionally defining WM by 
proposing a unitary system of activated memory.  According to Cowan’s Embedded-
Processes Model, WM does not entail a distinct mechanism; rather, WM is more accurately 
viewed as a subset of activated memory embedded within LTM.  The contents of WM 
consist of accessed task specific information within the current focus of attention, or 
information that is readily accessible with sufficiently pertinent retrieval cues, with attention 
allocated by both the central executive and by sufficient external cues (Cowan, 1999).   
Functional approaches to the WM-LTM relationship.  Functional frameworks 
focus on how working memory may be recruited in service of cognitive demands.  For 
example, Ericsson and colleagues (Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) 
conceptualized a model of long-term working memory, in which expert task performance 
involves the use of specialized encoding strategies.  According to this model, task specific 
information is encoded in association with preexisting semantic knowledge in anticipation of 
future retrieval demands.  Information stored in this way is subsequently capable of being 
easily and efficiently accessed upon exposure to appropriate retrieval cues (Ericsson & 
Delaney, 1999).  
A second group of functional theories conceptualize WM as a domain-general 
executive attention mechanism, which functions to keep task relevant information in a 
readily accessible state (Kane et al., 2004).  These theories emphasize the difference between 
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complex working memory span (CWMS) tasks and short-term memory (STM) span tasks in 
predicting complex cognitive functions like reasoning and language comprehension.  
Whereas STM tasks encompass the storage and recall of information, CWMS tasks focus on 
the storage and recall of information in the face of cognitively engaging processing demands 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  The processing demands of a typical CWMS task serve to 
displace to-be-remembered items from the current focus of attention such that successful 
completion of the recall task requires that this displaced information be retrieved from 
secondary storage systems (LTM).  Executively controlled retrieval operations are thought to 
be mediated by task-relevant contextual cues and function to reactivate displaced information 
stored in LTM (Chein et al., 2011; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).   WM capacity, therefore, 
entails the ability to actively maintain information within the current focus of attention while 
also efficiently retrieving and maintaining displaced information.  Such a theoretical 
framework extends Cowan’s embedded process model to explain why WM tasks are 
powerful predictors of other complex cognitive tasks and may explain the shared variance 
between WM and LTM measures (Unsworth, 2010).     
Chein et al. (2011) investigated whether brain regions implicated in CWMS tasks 
underlie domain-general functions for both verbal and spatial WM tasks, utilizing a novel 
WM imaging paradigm.  Lateral prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal cortices were 
activated during the encoding, maintenance, and coordination phase of the task, suggesting 
their role as attentional control and selection mechanisms.  Anterior PFC and MTL 
(including posterior hippocampus and inferior portions of the parahippocampal gyrus) were 
activated during the recall phase of the WM task.  This latter pattern of activation is 
consistent with the previously mentioned framework proposed by Unsworth and Engle 
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(2007), suggesting that the interaction between anterior PFC and MTL may indicate a 
“controlled search mechanism…critically involved in reactivating information from LTM” 
(Chein et al., 2011, p. 557) previously displaced by the CWMS task, suggesting the 
involvement of LTM mechanisms in mediating the relationship between WM and cognitive 
performance (Chein et al., 2011; Faraco et al., 2011; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  Notably, 
these neural regions, which correspond with the aforementioned autobiographical network 
underlying both episodic memory and future thought, have been observed to be preferentially 
engaged during future, relative to past, oriented-tasks (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003). 
Recent studies have found that executive processes play an important role supporting 
episodic future thought.  For example, D’Argembeau and colleagues (2010) examined the 
influence of individual differences in eight component processes across four autobiographical 
past and future measures.  In this study, participants completed a series of basic cognitive 
tests and questionnaires in order to determine which factors predicted people’s fluency and 
clarity of their future imaginings. An exploratory principal components analysis of the eight 
component measures yielded three factors (tasks with highest factor loadings, >.70, in 
parentheses):  visual-spatial processing (Block Design Test, Visual Patterns Test), executive 
processes (Phonemic and Semantic Fluency), and verbal relational memory (Verbal Paired 
Associates).   
The results from the D’Argembeau et al. (2010) study indicated that executive 
processes significantly predicted several facets of both past and future autobiographical event 
generation.  The authors interpreted this as reflecting a general executive role supporting 
retrieval, monitoring, and selection of autobiographical knowledge necessary when 
constructing past and future events.  In addition, visuo-spatial processes contributed to the 
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number of sensory details included in future event narratives, likely attributable to the 
increased demands of constructing a novel event rich in visual imagery.  Verbal relational 
memory was not related to any of the autobiographical measures, possibly attributable to the 
low ecological validity of the Verbal Paired Associates task which loaded most heavily on 
this factor (McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009).  Notably, this study included the Letter-
Number Sequencing subtest as a measure of WM; however, when collapsing each of the 
measures across the three aforementioned factors, Letter-Number Sequencing performance 
exhibited moderate loadings on each.  Any direct observation of WM contributions to 
episodic future thought was, therefore, not possible.   
Overview of the Present Study 
 In the current study, I took an individual differences approach to investigate the 
hypothesis that WM provides the cognitive structure on which disparate episodes stored in 
LTM are accessed and then integrated to form a mental representation of a novel future 
event.  The methods and measures used in this study were adapted from the aforementioned 
study by D’Argembeau and colleagues (2010), which similarly focused on the component 
processes uniquely contributing to episodic future thought.  The primary question was 
whether individual differences in WM differentially predict measures of episodic past and 
future oriented tasks, and the extent to which WM serves a domain-general role in supporting 
episodic future thought.  Based on the increased neural activations of brain regions while 
imagining the future relative to recalling the past, taken with the relationship between 
executive processes and future directed thought (D’Argembeau et al., 2010), the primary 
hypothesis was that WM would correlate with episodic future thought over and above 
autobiographical memory.  Due to the speculated domain generality of WM and specificity 
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of STM tasks (Chein et al., 2011; Kane et al., 2004), I also expected verbal and visuo-spatial 
WM to similarly predict performance on the past and future autobiographical tasks, and 
visuo-spatial STM to be more closely related to past and future autobiographical performance 
than verbal STM. 
Method 
Participants   
Participants were 109 college students (71 women, 38 men; mean age 19.3 years old, 
SD = 3.0) enrolled in introductory and intermediate psychology classes at Appalachian State 
University who elected to enter the psychology subject pool in order to fulfill an experiential 
learning credit for their course.  All study procedures adhered to the ethical standards 
outlined by the institutional review board (IRB).  This study received exempt status from the 
IRB on August 31, 2011 (see Appendix A); therefore, signatures were not required during the 
consent process.  Verbal informed consent was obtained prior to the study procedures (see 
Appendix B).  Data from the operation span and episodic details task were missing for one 
participant who was unable to complete all study procedures due to time constraints.   
Materials 
Participants completed three measures of episodic memory and future thinking 
borrowed from D’Argembeau et al. (2010):  autobiographical fluency, episodic specificity, 
and number of episodic details.  Participants also completed verbal and visuo-spatial CWMS 
tasks, and verbal and visuo-spatial STM tasks.  All measures were administered on a desktop 
computer using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Autobiographical fluency.  The autobiographical fluency task assessed the ability to 
generate multiple generic representations of past and future events.  Participants were 
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instructed to think about two time periods from their past (within the past year and within the 
past 5-10 years) and two time periods in their future (within the next year and within the next 
5-10 years).  Participants were given 60 seconds to generate as many events as possible that 
occurred or may occur within the specified time frame.  Instructions indicated that the events 
could be trivial or important.  Participants were also instructed that responses were not 
required to be detailed.  The order of cue presentation was counterbalanced across temporal 
direction (past or future), with the one-year time period presented first, regardless of 
temporal direction.  Scores were based on the total number of events generated for each time 
period.  Following D’Argembeau et al. (2010), the two time periods from each temporal 
direction were subsequently combined to produce a total past and total future fluency score.   
Episodic specificity.  The episodic specificity task assessed the ability to generate 
specific autobiographical past and future events.  Participants were cued to recall specific 
events occurring in their personal past and specific events that might reasonably occur in 
their personal future.  Participants were instructed to identify unique events that take place in 
a specific place at a specific time, lasting a few minutes to hours, but not more than a day.  
Two sets of five cue words were used, matched for imageablitity, frequency of use, and word 
length (Tse & Altarriba, 2007; see Appendix C), and counterbalanced across past and future 
conditions.  The order in which the participants completed the two time conditions was also 
counterbalanced. 
For scoring purposes, responses were counted as specific when occurring at a specific 
place and time, lasting a few minutes or hours, but less than one day (e.g., “I am going 
camping near Wilson Creek next weekend; I can imagine arriving at the trailhead in the 
afternoon and hiking to the river to find a nice spot”).  The total number of specific events 
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generated for each temporal condition was computed, yielding a past and future specificity 
score.  The highest possible score for either temporal condition was 5. 
Episodic details.  The episodic details task, adapted from Hassabis et al. (2007), 
assessed the number of details participants were able to generate when recalling or imagining 
specific episodic events.  Participants were cued to think about a past or future episodic event 
and then were instructed to elaborate on the details of that event, providing as many sensory 
and introspective details as possible.  Instructions specified that the events should be unique, 
occurring at a specific place and time, lasting a few minutes or hours, but less than one day.  
Future events were additionally required to be both plausible and novel.  The past and future 
event cues were adopted from D’Argembeau et al. (2010) and the assignment of each cue to 
a particular temporal direction was counterbalanced across participants (e.g., “recall the last 
time you met a friend; imagine something you will do on your next vacation” or “recall 
something you did on your last vacation; imagine the next time you will meet a friend”). 
 For scoring purposes, each event description was broken into a set of statements, 
roughly constituting a single idea unit.  These statements were then classified into six 
categories:  spatial reference, entity presence, sensory description, thoughts and emotions, 
actions, or temporal reference.  Spatial references included aspects related to the position or 
direction of entities relative to the participant’s vantage point (e.g., “she sat to my left”), 
references to explicit measurements (e.g., “about 50 feet from the water”), as well as distinct 
locations (e.g., “Florida”).  Any reference to a distinct, concrete object was categorized as an 
entity (objects, people, animals, etc.).  The sensory description category consisted of 
references to the qualitative properties of entities or of the environment (e.g., “the water is 
dark blue,” “it is very humid”).  The thoughts and emotions category included introspective 
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thoughts and emotions of the participant or any other entities in the scene.  Likewise, actions 
constituted any action initiated by an entity within the scene.  The temporal category was 
adopted by D’Argembeau et al. (2010) and included references to the temporal context of an 
event (e.g., “last winter”) as well as time measurements (e.g., “four hours later”).    
Operation span. The operation span (OSPAN) is a measure of verbal WM (Engle et 
al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004) in which participants must recall a string of letters while 
simultaneously completing an algebraic processing task.  The algebraic operation consists of 
a parenthetical multiplication or division problem, followed by a number which must be 
added or subtracted from the previous product or dividend.   In this automated version of the 
task, participants must decide whether a given response correctly answers the algebraic 
operation, and they are then presented with a letter to be recalled at the end of the sequence 
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  
The OSPAN is a widely used measure of verbal WM, generally showing high internal 
consistency (Chronbach’s α = .80, Kane et al., 2004).  In the automated version, participants 
completed three trials each of spans ranging from 3-7 operation-letter pairs per set (Figure 1).  
Set sizes randomly varied across trials so participants were unaware of the sequence length to 
be recalled before being cued.  Throughout the task, participants received feedback on their 
performance on the algebraic processing task.  In order to ensure that attention was 
adequately focused on the processing tasks, participants were instructed to keep their scores 
at or above 85%.  Scores were determined based on the total number of letters recalled in the 
correct ordinal position.   
Symmetry span.  The symmetry span is a measure of visuo-spatial WM exhibiting 
high internal consistency (Chronbach’s α = .80, Kane et al., 2004).   This automated version 
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of the task requires participants to recall the spatial locations of a sequence of shaded squares 
within a 4 x 4 matrix while simultaneously completing a symmetry judgment processing task 
(Unsworth et al., 2005).  The symmetry judgment consisted of an 8 x 8 matrix with some of 
the squares filled in black.  The participants were required to determine whether the black 
squares were symmetrical along the vertical axis.  Participants completed three trials each of 
spans ranging from 3-7 memory matrices and symmetry judgments per set (Figure 1).  Scores 
were determined based on the total number of locations recalled in the correct ordinal 
position.    
Letter span.  The letter span is a measure of verbal STM in which participants 
recalled sequences of letters presented visually on a computer screen for one second with a 
500 millisecond (ms) blank screen between each letter (Kane et al., 2004).  At the end of 
each trial, participants were required to recall the letters in their correct ordinal positions.  
Participants completed three trials each of randomly ordered spans ranging from 3-8 letters 
per set (18 sets total).  Scores were based on the total number of letters recalled in the correct 
ordinal position.    
Matrix span.  The matrix span is a measure of visuo-spatial STM in which 
participants recalled the location of a shaded square within a sequence of visually presented 4 
x 4 matrices (Kane et al., 2004).  Each matrix was presented for 650-ms with a 500-ms blank 
screen between each presentation.  At the end of a trial, participants indicated the locations of 
the shaded boxes in the order in which they were presented.  Participants completed three 
trials each of randomly ordered spans ranging from 2-7 matrices per set (18 sets total).  
Scores were based on the total number of locations recalled in the correct ordinal position.   
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Procedure 
After obtaining informed consent (Appendix B), participants completed the measures 
in the following order:  letter and matrix span, autobiographical fluency, OSPAN or 
symmetry span, episodic specificity, OSPAN or symmetry span, episodic details.  The WM 
and STM span tasks were counterbalanced across participants, with the STM tasks completed 
first and the WM tasks separating the autobiographical measures.  Borrowing from 
D’Argembeau et al. (2010), the autobiographical tasks were presented in a fixed order due to 
the increasingly explicit instructions for generating episodic events.  The total time to 
complete all experimental procedures was approximately one hour. 
Results 
WM Tasks 
Correlations between verbal and visuo-spatial WM and STM as well as descriptive 
statistics and reliability estimates are shown in Table 1.  Reliability estimates (Cronbach’s α) 
were generally high and consistent with previously reported values (Kane et al., 2004).   As 
described above, previous research (e.g., Kane et al., 2004) suggested that the WM tasks 
should tap both domain general and domain specific abilities; whereas, the STM tasks should 
primarily be domain specific.  If this was true, I would expect to observe the following 
patterns:  (a) moderate to strong correlations between verbal and visuo-spatial WM; (b) 
moderate to strong correlations between same-domain WM and STM tasks (e.g., verbal WM 
and verbal STM); (c) weak correlations between cross-domain measures of WM and STM 
(e.g., verbal WM and visuo-spatial STM); and (d) weak correlations between verbal and 
visuo-spatial STM.   
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As may be seen in Table 1, both measures of WM were strongly correlated, whereas 
the STM measures were not significantly related, consistent with expectations.  However, the 
cross-domain correlations between WM and STM were inconsistent with those reported by 
Kane et al. (2004).  In particular, visuo-spatial WM was significantly more related to verbal 
STM than to visuo-spatial STM, t(106) = 2.80, p < .01, though the inverse pattern was 
expected.  Furthermore, though verbal WM and the two STM tasks exhibited correlation 
patterns consistent with what I expected (i.e., strongest relationship observed between verbal 
WM and verbal STM), the correlations were not statistically different, t(106) = .43, p > .05.   
 To further examine the domain generality and specificity issue, I performed an 
exploratory principal components analysis to determine whether the WM and STM measures 
could be reduced into domain general and domain specific component constructs.  This 
analysis yielded only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 and accounting for 52% 
of the total variance, which can be characterized as a general measure of WM capacity.  
Factor loadings are shown in Table 2.  I used the resulting factor score as a composite 
measure of WM capacity in all subsequent analyses.  Because the WM data was not 
consistent with separable domain general and domain specific WM components, the 
remaining analyses will focus on the primary hypothesis that WM contributes to episodic 
future thought independently of past autobiographical performance.   
Future Thought Tasks 
Each of the autobiographical measures was scored by three independent raters trained 
using the previously mentioned scoring procedures.  Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) 
indicated that there was generally strong agreement between the raters with respect to the 
number of autobiographical events generated in the fluency task (past ICC = .98, future ICC 
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= .99), the number of specific events produced in the episodic specificity task (past ICC = 
.77, future ICC = .79), and the total content scores in the episodic details task (past ICC = 
.98, future ICC = .98). 
Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for the past and future 
autobiographical measures and WM composite are shown in Table 3.  Scores for 
autobiographical fluency and episodic specificity were higher for past events than for future 
events [tfluency (108) = 2.12, p = .036; tspecificity (108) = 6.40, p < .001], which is consistent with 
previous research (Addis et al., 2008; D’Argembeau et al., 2010).  The total number of 
episodic details, however, did not significantly differ between past and future events, tdetails 
(103) = 1.53, p = .129.  Each measure of future thought was also correlated with its past 
counterpart.  Among the autobiographical measures, past and future fluency exhibited the 
most striking relationship, as 64% of the variance in future fluency performance could be 
accounted for by past fluency.  Conversely, a much smaller percentage of shared variance 
was observed between past and future measures of episodic specificity (18%) and details 
(25%).  Composite WM capacity correlated with future specificity but none of the other 
autobiographical tasks. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to test the independent 
contributions of WM on future thought, over and above autobiographical memory.  For each 
future measure, the corresponding autobiographical memory task was entered as a predictor 
of future thought in Step 1; WM was entered in Step 2 to determine any unique shared 
variance not accounted for by the corresponding autobiographical memory task.  Results 
from these analyses are shown in Table 4.  As can be seen, past fluency was a significant 
predictor of future fluency, whereas WM capacity did not independently contribute to future 
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fluency.  Past episodic specificity contributed to performance on the future specificity task; 
when controlling for past specificity, residual WM capacity independently predicted an 
additional 5% of the variance in future specificity.  The total amount of details included in 
past narratives predicted the total content scores of future narratives; WM capacity did not 
independently contribute to future content scores when controlling for past details.         
Discussion 
In this study, I took an individual differences approach to investigate the role WM 
plays in the ability to generate future episodic events.  Participants completed measures of 
episodic memory and future thought, as well as verbal and visuo-spatial WM and STM tasks.  
Using a composite score of WM capacity, I was able to examine the extent to which residual 
WM variance contributed to future thought while controlling for autobiographical memory.  
However, because the relationships between the measures of WM and STM were 
inconsistent with previous values, I was unable to explore the extent to which domain general 
and domain specific components of WM capacity contributed to various facets of episodic 
future thought.  The results indicated that:  (a) the ability to imagine personally relevant 
events in the future was strongly related to autobiographical memory; and (b) even when 
controlling for autobiographical memory, WM capacity uniquely predicted the ability to 
imagine future events within a distinct spatio-temporal context. 
Measures of autobiographical memory were correlated with corresponding measures 
of future thought, which is consistent with the hypothesis that autobiographical memory and 
episodic future thought are supported by largely overlapping neurocognitive mechanisms 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  The similarities between the 
autobiographical measures were particularly evident in the highly correlated fluency tasks.  
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Notably, the fluency tasks were the least demanding of the autobiographical measures in 
terms of generating episodic details, with no criteria to elaborate on the specificity or details 
of that event.  Additionally, events were not required to be episodic in the sense that they 
occur at a distinct time and place.  The strong correlation between past and future 
autobiographical fluency thus suggests that accessing autobiographical information – 
regardless of temporal direction – appears to load on largely overlapping retrieval 
mechanisms.  Each of the six autobiographical tasks used in the present study likely rely on 
similar retrieval operations (D’Argembeau et al., 2010), which may account for the moderate 
to strong correlations observed among each of the corresponding past and future measures.  
However, additional cognitive mechanisms are required as the demands associated with each 
task become increasingly explicit (i.e., required to recall and imagine increasingly unique and 
detailed events).  This would account for the attenuated relationships observed among the 
specificity and detail tasks, which no longer rely chiefly on retrieval mechanisms.  Instead, 
additional cognitive mechanisms are likely necessary when elaborating on vivid episodic 
events. 
WM capacity correlated with performance on the future specificity task, though a 
similar relationship was not observed between WM and past specificity.  WM was not related 
to any of the other past or future autobiographical measures.  Results from a regression 
analysis further showed that even when controlling for past specificity, residual WM 
variance uniquely predicted the ability to imagine a specific future event, replicating 
D’Argembeau and colleagues (2010).  These results may reflect the increased cognitive 
demands of imagining a future event occurring within a specific context.  Recent models 
have conceptualized episodic future thought as a protracted generative process 
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(D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011).  Semantic knowledge corresponding to an autobiographical 
narrative, consisting of personal goals (e.g., obtaining a PhD) and temporally extended life 
events (e.g., tenure as a graduate student), provides the contextual framework for the retrieval 
of progressively explicit levels of specificity and episodic details (e.g., imagining the date of 
my thesis defense including the location, committee members in attendance, and Dr. Zrull’s 
sweater vest and jeans).  WM likely represents the attentional resources necessary to 
maintain increasingly specific and disparate information, which is subsequently bound into a 
unitary and coherent mental simulation of a future event.  This interpretation suggests a 
functional role similar to that of Baddeley’s episodic buffer (2000). 
Controlled attention becomes particularly important when information must be kept 
in an active state in the face of other competing information (Engle et al., 1999).  Research 
has indicated that increasingly specific levels of autobiographical memory are largely 
mediated by inhibitory processes (Piolino et al., 2010).  Imagining a specific future event 
likely places even greater demands on similar strategic executive mechanisms.  Specifically, 
whereas previously experienced events are restricted in time and place, future events have the 
potential of occurring within any number of possible contexts.  When imagining a plausible 
future event, information inconsistent with that event’s particular context must be suppressed 
during the constructive process.  Therefore, the greater demands likely placed on inhibitory 
mechanisms when imagining a realistic future event may account for the unique 
contributions of WM to future specificity. 
If WM does in fact provide the mental workspace necessary to actively maintain and 
integrate disparate information into a coherent future event, future event narratives rich in 
sensory-perceptual details should similarly load on the same attentional resources 
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hypothesized to aid future specificity.  However, this was not the case in the present study as 
I failed to observe a relationship between WM capacity and the measure of future details.  
One explanation may lie in the procedure used to score the amount of details included in past 
and future event narratives.  Specifically, all unique details were counted towards an event’s 
total content score; no distinction was made between general semantic and contextually 
specific episodic aspects of that event.  Relative to the retrieval of episodic information, 
accessing semantic personal knowledge places fewer demands on inhibitory processes 
(Piolino et al., 2010).  It is therefore possible that the inclusion of semantic details in an 
event’s total content score may have veiled any potential contributions of WM when 
elaborating on future events.   
Another explanation may be related to differences in the prompts used to cue episodic 
events in the specificity and details tasks.  Whereas the episodic specificity tasks used an 
open-ended cue-word technique to elicit an episodic event, the details task prompted 
participants to provide a narrative corresponding to a particular episode (e.g., imagine your 
next vacation).  Because the inherent specificity of this kind of cue limits the potential details 
that may be associated with an imagined future event, it is likely that fewer demands are 
placed on inhibitory processes relative to those required during the open-ended specificity 
task.  Additional research is necessary to further explore the potential link between WM 
capacity and detailed future event narratives. 
Notably, the results from this study deviated somewhat from those reported by 
D’Argembeau and colleagues (2010) who observed much more robust relationships between 
executive processes and the past and future autobiographical measures.  Specifically, 
whereas both studies indicated a relationship between executive measures and future 
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specificity, D’Argembeau noted additional relationships between executive processes and 
both past and future autobiographical fluency and episodic details.  These differences likely 
stem from the distinct executive constructs being explored in each study.  In the 
D’Argembeau study, executive processes consisted of measures of phonemic and semantic 
fluency, tasks which load heavily on strategic retrieval operations.  Accordingly, their results 
indicated broad executive involvement in both past and future autobiographical event 
knowledge, which was interpreted as reflecting a general executive role in the retrieval and 
monitoring of autobiographical information in support of episodic recollection and 
prospection.  In the present study, I was primarily interested in the relationship between 
future thought and WM capacity, a widely used measure of executive attention.  The 
inherently distinct constructs explored in each study likely support different facets of future 
thought.  Whereas retrieval operations seem to play a general role in access to 
autobiographical thought, the unique demands of imagining a specific future event likely 
place higher demands on attentional resources which mediate the active maintenance and 
integration of disparate information into a unitary future event. 
 The results of this study are generally consistent with neuroimaging research 
reporting extensive neural overlap among past and future autobiographical processes (Addis 
et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007).  Notably, 
differences in the magnitude of activation patterns elicited by past and future oriented tasks 
have been observed in regions within this neural overlap, particularly in portions of lateral 
and medial PFC and medial temporal lobes, including the hippocampus (Addis et al., 2007; 
Okuda et al., 2003).  Among the studies reporting asymmetries in the scale of neural 
activation across temporal directions, increased activity is reported exclusively in response to 
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future oriented tasks and is likely attributable to the increased cognitive demands of flexibly 
recombining multiple past episodes into a unitary future event representation (Addis et al., 
2007).   
One of the primary objectives of this study was to explore whether WM capacity may 
partially account for the increased cognitive demands hypothesized to support future thought.  
Indeed, the regions in which increased activity is seen in response to future thought 
correspond with regions believed to support the controlled attention and retrieval operations 
underlying WM capacity.  Specifically, functional interactions between lateral and medial 
PFC and the hippocampus have been suggested to assist in the temporary storage of 
information within WM as well as the selective reactivation of content which has been 
displaced by competing information (Chein et al., 2011; Yoon, Okada, Jung, & Kim, 2008).  
One potential limitation with the present results may stem from the observed 
specificity scores that  were lower than those reported by D’Argembeau et al. (2010).  
Furthermore, the distribution of the future specificity scores was positively skewed as nearly 
50% of participants failed to generate a single specific future event.  This may be due to time 
constraints associated with the specificity task in the current study.  When constructing a 
specific future narrative, semantic information is frequently provided before a specific event 
is produced (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011).  Accordingly, 30 seconds for each cue may not 
have been an adequate amount of time to mentally construct and then convey a specific novel 
event.  Though this may be viewed as a potential limitation, it is worth noting that the 
correlations between WM capacity and past and future specificity in the present study were 
nearly identical to those between executive processes and the specificity measures reported 
by D’Argembeau and colleagues (2010).  Though future research should address this, the 
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similar correlational patterns observed in both studies suggests that imagining specific future 
events does appear to tap executive mechanisms not similarly recruited when recalling 
specific past events. 
Another potential limitation with the present study was the large standard deviations 
observed on the past and future episodic details tasks (Table 3), which were much larger than 
previously reported values (D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007).  Because this 
was the final task in the experiment, and was the only task to be unconstrained by a time 
requirement, the large variability in total content scores may reflect individual differences in 
participants’ conscientious engagement with experimental procedures.  Taken with the 
aforementioned scoring procedures which failed to distinguish between semantic and 
episodic information, future research using alternative paradigms is necessary to further 
explore the relationship between WM capacity and episodically vivid future event narratives. 
 The use of college students, as well as prompts that restricted potential future 
episodes to events occurring within the next 10 years, may further affect the generalizability 
of the present results.  Specifically, among college students, the next 10 years typically 
represent the emergence into young adulthood.  Likewise, the events imagined as taking 
place during this period have a greater tendency of corresponding with cultural life-script 
events such as starting a career, getting married, the birth of a child, etc. (Bernsten & 
Jacobsen, 2008), which are qualitatively different from similar events not falling within the 
same temporal realm (Rubin & Bernsten, 2003).  Future research requiring the generation of 
events within a broad temporal range, as well as the inclusion of various age groups and 
demographics, is therefore necessary to further elucidate executive contributions to future 
thought. 
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Though recent studies have begun to explore the cognitive processes supporting 
episodic future thought, a broad and thorough understanding of the executive mechanisms 
underlying the constructive mental simulation of novel future events remains to be 
thoroughly explored.  Though previous research on this subject has indicated executive 
contributions to a range of future oriented autobiographical tasks (D’Argembeau et al., 
2010), it is important to consider that executive functions encompass a broad range of 
functionally specialized processes. In the present study, I focused on the relationship between 
future thought and WM capacity, a widely used measure of executive attention.  When 
imagining a specific future episodic event, WM appears to provide the attentional and 
inhibitory mechanisms necessary to strategically retrieve and manipulate disparate 
information into a unitary event simulation.  Therefore, this study was an important step in 
gaining a clearer and more nuanced understanding of how a range of executive processes 
contribute to episodic future thought. 
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Table 1 
Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for WM and STM Tasks 
Measure 1 2 3 4 M SD   α 
1.  Verbal WM -       55.04 15.23 .84 
2.  Visuo-spatial WM .49** - 
  
26.39  8.00 .77 
3.  Verbal STM .38** .52** - 
 
38.85 10.78 .60 
4.  Visuo-spatial STM .33** .21* .14 - 76.61 10.24 .76 
 
Note. WM = Working Memory; STM = Short-Term Memory 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 2 
WM and STM Factor Loadings 
Measure Factor Loading 
Visuo-spatial WM .81 
Verbal WM .79 
Verbal STM .73 
Visuo-spatial STM .52 
    
Note. WM = Working Memory; STM = Short-Term Memory. 
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Table 3 
Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Autobiographical Measures and 
Composite WM Scores 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1.  Past Fluency - 
      
16.61 5.73 
2.  Future Fluency .80** - 
     
15.79 6.76 
3.  Past Specificity .21* .11 - 
    
2.22 1.57 
4.  Future Specificity .18 .16 .42** - 
   
1.20 1.54 
5.  Past Details .36** .26** .25* .18 - 
  
17.17 11.83 
6.  Future Details .31** .24* .21* .24* .50** - 
 
15.61 11.62 
7.  WM Composite .06 .15 .01 .22* .19 .09 - - - 
 
Note. WM = Working Memory  
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 4 
R² Statistics from Multiple Regression Analyses 
Dependent Variable Predictor(s) R² ΔR² F(ΔR²) df 
Future Fluency Past Fluency .64 .64** 176.30 1, 98 
Future Fluency Past Fluency, WM .65 .01 2.83 1, 97 
      Future Specificity Past Specificity .18 .18** 21.18 1, 98 
Future Specificity Past Specificity, WM .23 .05* 6.00 1, 97 
      Future Details Past Details .25 .25** 31.66 1, 97 
Future Details Past Details, WM .25 .00 .01 1, 96 
 
Note. WM = Working Memory Composite.   
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Figure 1.  Automated Working Memory Tasks.  The Automated Operation Span task (upper) 
is a measure of verbal working memory in which participants must perform an arithmetic 
operation while simultaneously storing a sequence of to-be-recalled letters.  The Automated 
Symmetry Span task (lower) is a measure of visuo-spatial working memory in which 
participants must judge whether a pattern is symmetrical along the vertical axis while 
simultaneously storing the sequential locations of to-be-recalled squares within a 4 x 4 grid.  
The numbers in the top right corners indicate the order in which each screen is presented and 
are not visible to participants.  This image was reprinted from Barch et al. (2009).  
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review according to the regulatory category cited above under 45 CFR 46.101(b). Should you change 
any aspect of the proposal, you must contact the IRB before implementing the changes to make sure 
the exempt status continues to apply. Otherwise, you do not need to request an annual renewal of 
IRB approval. Please notify the IRB Office when you have completed the study.  
 
Best wishes with your research!  
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Appendix B 
Informed Consent 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Episodic Future Thought 
Principal Investigator: Paul F. Hill 
Department:  Psychology 
Contact Information:  Lisa Emery, 112B Smith-Wright Hall, 828-262-7667 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about how we remember past events, 
and how this may be related to how we imagine future events.  If you take part in this study, 
you will be one of about 100 people to do so.  By doing this study we hope to learn more 
about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie memory.  
 
What will I be asked to do? 
The research procedures will be conducted in room 201c of Smith-Wright Hall on the 
Appalachian State University campus.  You will need to come here one time during the 
study.  Each of those visits will take about one hour.  The total amount of time you will be 
asked to volunteer for this study is one hour over one day.   
 
You will be asked to complete a series of tasks on the computer.  Some of these tasks will 
measure your ability to recall sequences of information that have previously been presented 
to you.  You will also be asked to recall and elaborate on events from your past, and to 
imagine and describe events that are likely to take place in your future.  
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the research? 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the risk of harm for participating in this research study is no 
more than you would experience in everyday life.   
 
What are the possible benefits of this research?. 
 
There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information gained by 
doing this research may help others in the future.   
 
This study should help us learn more about how our memory functions. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? 
 
We will not pay you for the time you volunteer while being in this study.  For your 
participation in this study you will earn two Experiential Learning Credits (ELCs) for your 
course. 
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? 
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Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the 
study. When we write up the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the 
combined information. You will not be identified in any published or presented materials. 
 
This study is anonymous.  That means that no one, not even members of the research 
team, will know that the information you gave came from you. 
 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research from knowing that 
you gave us information or what that information is.  
 
We will not keep any record of your name indicating that you have participated in our study.  
All of your data will be identified by a random ID number and kept in a filing cabinet in a 
locked office.   
 
Records will be kept for 5 years after publication of the results, and then destroyed as 
specified by the American Psychological Association.  Your information will not be identified by 
your name. 
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this 
research, now or in the future.  You may contact the Principal Investigator at 
hillpf@appstate.edu.    If you have questions about your rights as someone taking part in 
research, contact the Appalachian Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2130 
(days), through email at irb@appstate.edu or at Appalachian State University, Office of 
Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate?  What else should I know? 
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  If you choose not to volunteer, 
there will be no penalty and you will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have.  
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you 
no longer want to continue. There will be no penalty and no loss of benefits or rights if you 
decide at any time to stop participating in the study.   
 
You may choose to write a research paper for credit in lieu of participating in this study. 
 
This submission has been reviewed by the IRB Office and was determined to be exempt 
from further review. 
 
I have decided I want to take part in this research.  What should I do now? 
 
The person obtaining informed consent will ask you to read the following and if you agree, 
you should indicate your agreement:   
• I have read (or had read to me) all of the above information.   
• I have had an opportunity to ask questions about things in this research I did not 
understand and have received satisfactory answers.   
• I understand that I can stop taking part in this study at any time.   
• I understand I am not giving up any of my rights.   
• I have been given a copy of this consent document, and it is mine to keep.  
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Appendix C 
Cue-words for the episodic specificity task 
 
List A     
Money     
Art     
Health     
Police     
Gender    
 
List B 
Father 
Death 
School 
Culture 
Science 
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